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Abstract: The paper identifies intra and extra-regional import trade in 1868 HS 6-digits 
products by Cape Verde at the single country and 13 trade classification section levels, from the 
EU, the ECOWAS sub-region, and the ROW. Sensitive products enumeration was based on “Cape 
Verde‟s imports of products from the different trade classification (TDC) sections- from ECOWAS, 
the EU and the rest of the world (ROW), of which ECOWAS member nations were suppliers at 
the single country level”. It investigates the likely trade, revenue and welfare consequences of 
Cape Verde of embarking on free trade under economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the 
EU, using the partial equilibrium analysis and suggesting how EPAs can facilitate intra-regional 
trade. Cape Verde and indeed most other ECOWAS member nations would likely benefit from 
EPAs by adjusting to and treating all products of trade classification sections currently imported 
from the region as sensitive for EPAs, hence postponing any reductions or removal of tariffs on 
imports of such products from the EU. This measure would likely deepen regional integration 
and sustain markets and traded products within the regional markets. The EU could therefore 
support measures that enhance the productivity and competitiveness of domestic producers to 
ensure improved supply-side capacity. Cape Verde entering into such agreements should consider 
liberalization of products of the trade classification sections that are not produced and marketed 
among members of the region. Liberalizing substantially across all products of all trade 
classification sections, even considering 20% as sensitive products across board would have 
adverse trade, revenue and welfare impacts. Policies should be geared towards careful adjusting 
to liberalization patterns and reforms that would sustain regional markets and reallocate 
resources from contracting to expanding products of various trade classification sections. This 
will go a long way to improving, sustaining and deepening regional integration through trade on 
TDC sections 01-13 products.   
Key Words: EPAs, Cape Verde, EU, Liberalization, Revenue, Trade, Welfare Effects. 
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1.0 Introduction   
The purpose of international trade policy is to help a nation's international trade run 
more smoothly, by setting clear standards and goals which can be understood by potential 
trading partners. Trade patterns might be altered in several ways that might result in trade 
creation and trade diversion. The former relates to increased trade between the FTA members, 
while the latter concerns trade between members and non -members. Trade creation will be 
welfare enhancing, but trade diversion could distort total welfare benefits and even make them 
negative (Viner, 1950; Morrissey and Zgovu (2007). Hence, estimates on the trade impact of free 
trade agreements are necessary for evaluating the merits of trade integration.  
The EPAs are set out to help West African countries integrate into the world economy 
and share in the opportunities offered by globalization. Provision of scope for wide-ranging trade 
co-operation on areas such as services, and standards acting as drivers of change are meant to 
kick-start reform and help strengthen rule of law in the economic field, thereby attracting for eign 
direct investment (FDI), and helping to create a "virtuous circle" of growth  
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic -partner...). To preserve their 
access to the EU market after 2007, about 20 ACP countries concluded interim trade agreements. 
This light version of the original EPAs has not put an end to the negotiations as some of these 
countries would like to see the terms of the trade agreement revised, or their scope extended, and 
conclude the agreements at a regional level, to preserve their regional integration process 
(ECDPM, 2012). In this regards, one wonders how Ivory Coast and Ghana each could have a 
bilateral free trade agreement with the EU, since opening their domestic market to European  
products, while their West African partners, with whom they form a customs union, keep 
protecting their market from the EU would, very logical lead to EU goods flooding the whole 
regional markets via these two countries, rendering the West African customs union and further 
integration process totally ineffective. Recently, Europe threatened to withdraw the special trade 
preferences by 2014 to countries not showing commitment to proceed with their interim EPA. 
Europe's objective hopefully is to press for the conclusion of broader trade deals at regional level 
that would replace these awkward and controversial interim EPAs. In an apparently generous 
move, the European parliament's trade committee called on decision -makers to extend this 
deadline to 2016.  
The identification of these effects and regionally traded products/markets in a bid to 
sustaining them is necessary in aiding Cape Verde among other ECOWAS member nations in the 
negotiations by listing of sensitive products (products where trade already exist among ECOWAS 
regional partners). The issue of reciprocity is not welcome under an EPA since it will tend to 
threaten Cape Verde trade as well as intra-regional trade in ECOWAS region as a whole for a 
number of reasons. There is a direct displacement threat to the traded products existing among 
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regional suppliers by the elimination of the external tariff protection vis-à-vis European 
exporters. There is also an indirect threat associated with the displacement of domestic 
production by European exporters in domestic markets, which may thereby reduce regional 
production capacity and future prospects for intra-regional exporting. These threats to Cape 
Verde‟s and indeed the entire ECOWAS regional trade development can be offset in a number of 
ways. Most obviously, as negotiations allow for the exclusion of sensitive products and for phased 
introduction of the tariff reductions, Cape Verde and ECOWAS region in general may benefit by 
treating products currently traded within the region as sensitive for EPAs, hence avoiding or 
postponing any reductions on tariffs on imports from the EU. More so, from the trade data, 
(TRAINS, 2010), there is no evidence of supplies from ECOWAS member nations of products 
from trade sections (TDC14-21) corresponding to HS Chapters 71-97.   Put differently, the EU 
could provide „aid for regional trade‟ and support for measures that enhance the productivity and 
competitiveness of domestic producers, for export capacity (both intra - and extra-regional) to 
improve. If EPAs promote increased exports by ECOWAS member nations to the EU and 
liberalization limited to non sensitive products imported from the EU, there may be potential to 
benefit from spillovers (Chris Milner, Oliver Morrissey and Evious Zgovu, 2009). 
The results reported and discussed here are based on a number of ex ante studies of the 
trade effects of EPAs on various ACP groupings or countries undertaken by the authors. McKay, 
Milner and Morrissey (2005) analyzed the welfare impacts on the EAC; Greenaway and Milner 
(2006) covered CARICOM and Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2008) considered aspects of impact 
and adjustment costs for the EAC and Mauritius. Morrissey and Zgovu (2007) focus on 
agriculture and total imports respectively for a large sample of ACP countries to compare the 
welfare effects of a full liberalization with a scenario that excluded products traded intra-
regionally. They have not, however, explored in much detail the associated trade, welfare, tariff 
revenue, cum policy options for Cape Verde, nor have they explicitly considered necessary 
adjustments given the trade, revenue and welfare effects, vis-à-vis the products to be regarded as 
sensitive to reduce Cape Verde‟s trade development effects given ECOWAS as a sub region for 
embarking on free trade area with the EU. This paper aims at filling these gaps. The remainder 
of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the progress of EPA negotiations and 3 
discuss some of the existing theoretical and empirical literatures. Section 4 presents the 
Analytical frameworks, while section 5 x-rays the partial equilibrium model used to estimate 
trade, revenue and welfare effects of introducing an EPA on imports to ECOWAS countries from 
EU. Finally, section 6 sets out the conclusions and policy implications. 
 
1.1 Structure of Trade between Cape Verde and the EU by Products 
Table 1 presents the structure of trade between Cape Verde and the EU by products. It shows the 
Cape Verde‟s exports and imports to and from the EU, as well as the percentage share of total 
export to and imports from the EU of Cape Verde. 
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Table 1: Structure of Trade between Cape Verde and the EU by Products (% of Exports 
and Imports from EU of Various products 2011; €’ million) 
TDC Exports Share of Total TDC Import Share of Total TDC EU Trade
Sections to EU(€) Export to Eu(%) Sections from EU(€)Import from EU(%) Sections Balance with Cape Verde  
TDC 04 21 46.4 TDC 05 178 31 TDC 05 178
TDC 01 14 30.7 TDC 16 108 18.7 TDC 16 106
TDC 11 4 8.8 TDC 04 81 8.8 TDC 15 38
TDC 12 4 7.8 TDC 15 38 6.6 TDC 04 29
TDC 16 1 3.2 TDC 01 30 5.3 TDC 06 25
TDC 15 0 1.1 TDC 17 25 4.4 TDC 17 25
TDC 17 0 1 TDC 06 25 4.4 TDC 07 18
TDC 18 0 0.4 TDC 07 18 3.1 TDC 03 17
TDC 07 0 0.1 TDC 03 17 2.9 TDC 20 16
TDC 06 0 0.1 TDC 20 16 2.8 TDC 01 16
TDC 20 0 0 TDC 02 16 2.7 TDC 02 16
TDC 14 0 0 TDC 11 11 2 TDC 10 11
TDC 10 0 0 TDC 10 11 1.9 TDC 13 11
TDC 03 0 0 TDC 13 11 1.8 TDC 11 7
TDC 09 0 0 TDC 09 6 1 TDC 09 6
TDC 08 0 0 TDC 18 5 0.8 TDC 18 4
TDC 13 0 0 TDC 08 2 0.3 TDC 08 2
TDC 05 0 0 TDC 12 1 0.2 TDC 21 0
TDC 02 0 0 TDC 21 0 0 TDC 14 0
TDC 19 0 0 TDC 14 0 0 TDC 19 0
TDC 19 0 0 TDC 12 -2
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) World excluding Intra-EU trade and EU27 
Table 1 reveals that the major exports of Cape Verde to EU include prepared food stuffs; 
beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco, live animal/animal products, textiles and textile articles. 
The EU share of total imports of these products from Cape Verde stands at 46.4%, 30.7% and 8.8 
per cent, respectively. These major exports correspond to trade classification sections 04, 01, and 
11, comprising of HS chapters 25-27, 01-05, and 50-63 products.  Other trade classification 
sections where Cape Verde have zero exports to EU include TDC 14- Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious or semi precious metals; TDC 19- Arms and ammunitions , parts or accessories thereof, 
and TDC 20- Miscellaneous manufacturing articles etc., corresponding to HS chapters 71, 93 and 
94-96, respectively. Also from the table Cape Verde have no evidence of importation of natural or 
cultured pearls and arms and ammunitions from the EU. It is evident from our COMTRADE 
data that products where Cape Verde simultaneously imported from other ECOWAS member 
nations, the EU and the ROW ranged from HS chapters 01-70, corresponding to trade 
classification section 01-13. Therefore, sensitive products listing would consist of products drawn 
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from these chapters with given evidence of regional trade as specified in the trade classification 
sections and products of trade within ECOWAS sub-region (UNCOMTRADE data, 2010) 
1.2 Cape Verde Patterns of Imports from Three Regions ($’ Millions) 
Table2 presents the pattern of Cape Verde‟s imports from three different sources namely, 
ECOWAS, the EU and the rest of the world (ROW) and the corresponding percentage shares. 
Table 2: Cape Verde Patterns of Imports from Three Regions ($’ Millions) 
Cape Verde TDC From EU % Share From % Share From % Share World
HS Description Sections ($) ECOWAS ROW Total
Animal Products TDC 01 34136.29 74.28 35.107 0.08 11782.69 25.64 45954.08
Veg. Products TDC 02 24910.52 40.83 832.234 1.36 35265.86 57.81 61008.59
Animal/Veg ProductsTDC 03 15104.25 94.19 3.367 0.02 928.858 5.79 16036.48
Prep foodstuffs etc. TDC 04 63134.05 75.72 2615.712 3.02 17633.16 21.15 83382.92
Mineral Products TDC 05 113182.8 95.05 2511.601 2.11 3420.733 2.87 119115.1
Prod. of Chemicals TDC 06 31897.33 86.81 264.252 0.72 4580.84 12.47 36742.42
Plastics and Articles TDC 07 26191.8 94.05 69.113 0.25 1588.782 5.7 27849.7
Raw hides and Skins TDC 08 557.833 69.26 20.197 2.51 227.375 28.23 805.405
Wood & Articles of TDC 09 8929.435 74.3 2734.608 22.75 354.582 2.95 12018.62
Pulp of Wood etc. TDC 10 11977.47 84.92 54.356 0.38 2072.889 14.7 14104.72
Textiles & Articles TDC 11 4987.774 50.7 254.695 2.59 4596.292 46.72 9838.761
Footwear, Headgear TDC 12 1401.793 57 129.592 5.27 928.007 37.73 2459.392
Articles of Stone etc TDC 13 14818.42 87.22 10.752 0.06 2161.244 12.72 16990.42
 Source: Computed by the Authors from UNCOMTRADE Import Data 2010 
According to the contemporary assumptions, the products in which Cape Verde will likely 
experience displacement effects include those where her imports are up to 25% share from the 
EU and the ECOWAS regional import share is at least 5%. Table 2 shows that Cape Verde‟s 
imports from ECOWAS sub-region were up to 5% shares in Wood and articles of wood and 
Footwear and Headgear, but about 3% in a few other product sections such as prepared 
foodstuffs, Raw hides and skins, and Textile and textile products.  The later is lower than the 
contemporary scholars‟ percentage assumptions for ECOWAS regional imports (i.e. 5%) that may 
qualify for trade displacement, but for the fact of deepening and sustaining ECOWAS regional 
integration and markets, 1% share could be considered(see Table 2 above). Based on the 
contemporary percentage assumptions, displacement effects will not be possible in products such 
as Animal products, Vegetable products, Animal and vegetable products, Mineral products, 
products of chemicals, plastics and articles, pulp of wood etc., and articles of stone etc in which 
regional import shares were not up to 5% of the total product imports of the respective trade 
classification sections. This may not the best policy option for the sub region since products that 
have evidence of trade would likely increase in volume on the long run if sustained from the 1% 
share.    
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Besides, and for the contemporary scholars, trade diversion effects would occur where the 
Cape Verde import shares from EU were within 10 percent points of the rest of the World (ROW) 
share as in Vegetable products and textiles and articles of. Hitherto, even if the import shares of 
the products are less than 10%, trade diversion away from ROW to EU would result in loss of 
tariff revenue, which is not welfare enhancing and should be guard against during ECOWAS 
EPAs negotiations with the EU. 
The EPAs are both based on and aimed at the process of integration and regional 
cooperation already embarked upon by the ECOWAS countries, thus promoting intra-ECOWAS 
trade with a view to stimulating their integration into the world economy. The expectation that 
these objectives can be achieved is a major problem. Will they be compatible with development 
needs in Burkina Faso and other ECOWAS countries? Will the EPAs be sufficiently flexible in 
their design to enable Burkina Faso and other ECOWAS countries to adapt? Are the countries 
themselves ready for such wide-ranging negotiations? Who, which products will really benefit 
from the EPAs? Will all traded products within the ECOWAS markets be regarded as sensitive 
and as such exempted from tariff removal?  
 This paper investigates the likely trade, welfare and revenue consequences on Cape 
Verde of embarking on free trade under an economic partnership agreements between ECOWAS 
and the EU, focusing on static effects.  
 The specific objectives of the study include to: -  
(1) describe the patterns of  imports of  trade classification (TDC) sections 01-13 by Cape Verde 
(2) estimatethe likely trade, welfare and revenue, among other associated effects on Cape Verde 
of embarking on free trade under an economic partnership agreements. 
(3) enumerate the sensitive products based on trade classification (TDC) sections. 
One of the major reasons for economic integration is to enhance welfare of the 
participating countries, and the major channel for achieving welfare benefits is through trade 
integration as in free trade areas. In many regions, groups of nations work together to create 
mutually beneficial trade policies (for an instance, tariff elimination) and accurate estimation of 
the impact of trade policy on trade flows are important for evaluating economic policy, as in 
deciding whether to join a free trade area or not. Secondly, establishing a free trade area and 
analyzing its impact on trade is an interesting case study for evaluating international trade 
theory, which typically predicts a negative correlation between trade and trade costs. In a recent 
article Anderson and Van Win coop (2004) gave an extensive overview of trade costs, which entail 
transportation costs, tariff and non-tariff barriers, and information and transaction costs. Free 
trade areas obviously decrease tariff and non tariff barriers as well as transaction costs. Thirdly, 
earlier studies on the trade impact of free trade areas have produced surprisingly wide range of 
estimates. Baier and Bergstrand (2002) and Glick and Rose (2002) reported large and positive 
trade creation effects indicating a doubling of trade or even more. However, using extreme 
bounds analysis, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) conclude that the empirical evidence on the trade-
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creating effects of regional trade agreements is fragile. In addition, case studies on particular free 
trade areas show mixed results. In particular, Cape Verde estimation results are typically absent.  
 
2.0 Main Issues in EPA Negotiations  
On West African side, EPAs negotiations were led by commissions of ECOWAS and UEMOA. 
ECOWAS is an organization of 15 countries seeking to promote regional economic integration 
and establish a functioning customs union. On the other hand, UEMOA is a monetary union of 8 
ECOWAS members (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-
Bissau). Its currency, the CFA-Franc, is issued by the UEMOA central bank (BCEAO), which is 
supported by the French Treasury and is fixed against the euro.  Their EPAs negotiations are 
focused on:  
 strengthening regional integration 
 prioritizing development and enhancing the region‟s development program (PAPED) 
 enhancing competitiveness (e.g. capacity -building for West African companies and 
exporters) 
 integrity of agricultural sector 
 alternative funding for net transitional and tax offsetting costs 
 inclusion of a regional list for sensitive West African products  
The Interim EPAs which were signed with Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) and initialed with 
Ghana cover the following: 
 duty and quota-free EU market access 
 gradual liberalization (removal of duties and quotas) over 15 years for 81% of EU imports 
to Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) and 80% to Ghana 
 EU exports are mainly industrial goods, vehicles and chemicals which do not compete 
with domestic production 
 safeguard provisions enabling both countries to protect fragile economic sectors by re-
introducing quotas or duties 
 agreement to foster cross-border trade within the region (e.g. more efficient customs 
procedures) 
 EU support to help local companies become more competitive and meet EU import 
standards 
At a regional level the focus of the €235M regional indicative programme is regional 
integration and trade with €118 million to support related programmes including building an 
ECOWAS customs union and common market and €82M for transport facilitation. The €65M 
PARI (Programme d‟Appui à l‟intégration) upport for UEMOA customs union is ongoing. Other 
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relevant regional programmes include €15M support to accreditation, standardization and 
promotion of quality under the PARI private sector programmes. Ongoing or planned projects 
include: 
 €3.7 million to support EPA negotiations in Mali 
 €2 million for EPA preparation and € 15M private sector support in Nigeria and 
 €3 million to support for capacity building in trade policy and regulation, Senegal 
 
3.0 Theoretical and Empirical Literature  
David Ricardo‟s (1817) standard trade theory hinges on batter of exports for imports;  
while Heckscher-Ohlin (1933) theorem conceptualized international trade as a phenomenon 
consisting of each country exporting goods and /or services in order to improve gr owth through 
comparative advantage, technology and competitiveness. This framework, otherwise referred to 
as inter-industry trade, was considered by economists as the most relevant for predicting the 
pattern of trade existing among nations. As well, it has been considered by many as the most 
logical way of embodying the links between factors of production, specialization, and patterns of 
trade among countries.  
The welfare gains from free international trade are several.  First, it enjoys the static 
gains from trade, which increases economic well-being of a region by holding resources and 
technology constant. This leads to consumption and production gains. Even though production 
may remain fixed, the opportunity to trade at world prices leads the consumption point to a 
higher consumption indifference curve. These gains come about because productive resources are 
channeled into the region‟s comparative advantage industries; and because of this redistribution 
of resources, overall output (GDP) rises, leading to the static production well-being from trade. 
Besides, dynamic welfare gains from trade bring about increases in the economic well-being that 
accrue to a region because trade induces increases in the productivity of existing resources. This 
is because the economy of a region grows over time either due to increases in its stock of 
productive factors or because a technological innovation helps a region‟s existing stock of factors 
to become more efficient, culminating to a shift in a region‟s production possibility frontiers. The 
relationship between international trade and economic growth are in terms of non restrictions of 
trade in both raw materials, intermediate products and capital goods, such that there would be 
increases in stock of these categories of goods in either of the regions at any point in time. In this 
way, the international trade will enhance the international diffusion of all products to ensure 
faster economic growth through greater competition that will encourage more efficient production,  
as the discrepancy between price and marginal cost is closed. In addition, as competitions destroy 
industry rents, fewer resources are devoted to wasteful rent-seeking behaviors. Moreover, given 
economy of scale, dynamic gains from free international trade accrue because trade expands the 
size of the market. As the market expands, industries are able to move further down their 
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average-cost curves, bringing down prices in the process. Again, expanding the size of the market 
may encourage industries to step up investments in research and development, as a way of 
spreading the costs of these investments over larger levels of output. These investments could, in 
turn, raise the overall level of technology of the region. Besides dynamic gains from international 
trade would accrue to the region by enlarging the pool of savings that is available to fund 
investment purchases, through the raising of the real income of the region above the level that 
would exist in autarky (Husted and Melvin, 1993). 
Recent empirical analyses are found in Laird and Yeats (1986), Panagariya (1998),  
Greenaway and Milner (2000), and Milner, Morrissey and McKay (2005), among others. McKay, 
et al (2005) presented a relatively simple method, requiring moderate data to measure the likely 
short-run welfare consequences, static effects on trade flows, and tariff revenue, of EPAs for ACP 
countries. The partial equilibrium method was illustrated for the case of East African 
Cooperation (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). The results suggested that the welfare effects 
(excluding revenue effects) from a reciprocal agreement with the EU will be small whether 
positive or negative, but ACP countries will experience short-run adjustment costs especially in 
the form of revenue losses. 
On the issue of welfare gains, Morrissey and Zgovu (2007) estimated the impact on a 
sample of 36 ACP countries of eliminating tariffs on agricultural imports from the EU under 
EPAs, considering trade, welfare and revenue effects. In their results, even assuming „immediate‟ 
complete elimination of all tariffs on agriculture imports from the EU, and when excluding up to 
20% of imports as sensitive products, over half of ACP countries are likely to experience welfare 
gains. However, although most LDCs gain (10 out of 13), most non -LDCs (about 60%) lose. The 
overall welfare effect relative to GDP tends to be very small, whether positive or negative. While 
potential tariff revenue losses are no negligible, given that countries have at least ten years in 
which to implement the tariff reductions, there is scope for tax substitution. They opined that an 
important issue is identifying the sensitive products (SPs) to be excluded, and that excluding SPs 
reduced the welfare gain (or increased the welfare loss) compared to estimates where no products 
are excluded. 
 
4.0 Analytical Frameworks  
We apply the partial equilibrium analytical framework used by McKay et al (2005) and Morrissey 
and Zgovu (2011). This we extended to the established theoretical framework for analyzing the 
economic (welfare) effect of regional integration (e.g., Balassa, 1974; Lyakurwa et al., 1997; Schiff 
and Winters, 2003) as applied by Panagariya (1998) to consider when small country like Cape 
Verde integrate with large countries (the EU in this case).  
The partial equilibrium approach did estimate the likely first order effects on imports and in 
principle these could form a basis for more detailed CGE country studies where feasible. Our 
estimates were considered to be indicative of the potential impact of EPAs on different trade 
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classification (TDC) sections imports in ECOWAS countries, highlighting sections where 
individual ECOWAS countries are suppliers and which should be considered as sensitive 
products and excluded from tariff removal. The effects of particular importance in this analysis 
include the welfare effect of an EPA as well as the beneficial trade creation which arises when 
inefficient production by domestic firms in Cape Verde is displaced by reduction or free tariff 
imports by more efficient producers in another new member country (the EU). This increases 
welfare in total through a more efficient allocation of production in Cape Verde and within the 
ECOWAS region as a whole. On the other hand, trade diversion imposes a welfare loss where 
imports from more efficient extra-regional suppliers from the Rest of the World (ROW) are 
diverted to less efficient intra-regional suppliers (the EU). For Cape Verde and the ECOWAS 
region as a whole, welfare increases if trade creation is greater than trade diversion. Although 
there is the assumption that the EU benefits, but we did not estimate this, rather we focused on 
the effects on Cape Verde and the products from trade classification sections in which ECOWAS 
country are suppliers as well as the EU and Rest of the World.  
We estimated and reported results for three effects. Consumption effects arise from 
increased imports at reduced prices; if the EU is initially the dominant supplier, the EPA results 
in pure consumption effects only, and this is clearly beneficial. Trade creation (TC) arises in this 
context when imports from the EU displace imports from other ECOWAS countries; assuming 
the EU is the more efficient producer, this increases welfare in the importing country (although 
producers in the exporting ECOWAS country lose).  Trade diversion refers t o a situation where 
the elimination of tariffs allows EU suppliers to displace more efficient producers in the ROW; 
this is likely to arise if pre-EPA the ROW is the dominant supplier.  
Figure1 illustrates the welfare effects of Free Trade Area arrangements for the case of 
Cape Verde (CVe) of an initial regional group, ECOWAS. The partner country‟s (P) supply curve 
is upward sloping and the supply for two (initial) outside suppliers (here the EU and the rest of 
the world - ROW) is assumed to be infinitely elastic. The analysis is partial equilibrium in nature,  
markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, and there is perfect substitutability between 
imported and domestically produced import substitutes. Assume that CV and P have already 
formed a PTA, and as small developing countries can be viewed jointly as being small relative to 
the EU and ROW who supply at constant cost ( 
EU
P and 
ROW
P respectively). In the case of figure 
1 we assume for expositional convenience that 
EU
P >
ROW
P , therefore subsequent discriminatory 
trade policies by the FTA towards the outside countries can have both trade creating and 
diverting effects. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Effect of Free Trade Area between Cape Verde and EU under EPAs  
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CVe represents Cape Verde‟s demand for imports, PS the partners‟ supply of exports, and EUS
and
ROW
S  are the respective export supply functions for the two outside country groupings, the 
EU and the rest of the world (ROW). We start with a FTA and a non-discriminatory (ad valorem) 
tariff (t) on extra-regional imports (where )1( tPP
ROW
ROWt
t
 but EU
t
P is not shown in the case 
of the higher cost EU supplier). The home country imports 
2
OM  in total, with 
1
OM  coming 
from the partner country and 
21
MM  from the rest of the world (ROW). By ruling out domestic 
production capability we can define welfare (W) by reference to consumer surplus with respect to 
the import demand function, “Cve”. The 
FTA
W
 
for each home country is given by the triangle
ROW
t
ABP plus the tariff revenue on extra-regional imports (area a + b). Now assume that the 
FTA introduces a discriminatory tariff policy towards extra-regional countries, and as a result of 
EPAs with the EU continues to impose tariff t on imports from ROW but allows imports from the 
EU in duty free. The relevant supply price is now PEU, with the total quantity of imports 
expanding from 
2
OM   to 
3
OM   and imports coming now wholly from the EU. There are strictly 
three components of this trade-effect of the EPAs; a consumption expansion effect
32
MM  , a 
„trade diversion‟ effect
21
MM  , and a „trade creation‟ effect
1
OM  . The last two of these effects 
need more careful explanation, however. In the case of standard PTA analysis trade diversion 
usually relates to diverting trade from more efficient extra-regional suppliers to less efficient 
intra-regional suppliers. The EPAs, however, diverts between extra-regional suppliers; 
21
MM  is 
imported from the less efficient EU rather than the ROW. The resource cost of this is represented 
by the area b, with total tariff revenue lost by the home country being area (a + b). Similarly, in 
Cve A 
PtROW 
PEU 
PROW 
M1 M2 M3 O 
SROW 
SEU 
StROW 
Sp 
c 
d 
a e 
b 
B 
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terms of standard FTA analysis, trade creation usually describes the displacement of less 
efficient home production by globally efficient extra-regional production. In this case, however, 
the EPAs involves the replacement of intra-regional imports by more (but here not globally) 
efficient extra-regional imports from the EU. The global resource-saving on this „trade-creation‟ 
(or trade source substitution) effect is shown by area c in Figure 1. This and the loss in producer 
surplus for partner country exporters (area d) allow consumer surplus on this component of the 
trade effect of the EPAs to increase by area (c + d). Thus, the welfare implications for the home 
country of shifting from the FTA to the EPAs are ambiguous, the consumption and trade-creation 
effects increasing welfare and the trade- W = (c+d+e) - b. 
Clearly the more efficient is the EU the smaller the costs of trade-diversion and the greater the 
probability of a welfare-improving EPA. Indeed in the extreme as 
EU
S
ROW
S then the EPAs 
tends toward the free trade outcome (McKay et el 2005). 
 
5.0 Model Specification 
In estimating the effects, we began with the trade data and allocated imports by products of the 
trade classification (TDC) sections into one of three cases (EU, ECOWAS, and ROW). In those 
sections where the EU is globally efficient and therefore the dominant supplier to a particular 
ECOWAS market prior to the formation of the EPAs, we assume that only consumption effects 
would follow from the EPAs. In terms of Figure 1 this is equivalent to assuming that 
ROW
S lies 
above 
EU
S and that there is no competitive regional supply capability.  
 
Consumption Effects  
Thus, for those products where the EU is the dominant supplier we estimated the consumption 
M
C  
 
EU
M
dM
M
t
t
C
0
.).
1
( 

                                                                                    (1)
 
 
where t is the MFN tariff rate imposed on imports from the EU in the present period n, 
M
d
 is elasticity of demand for imports, and 
EU
O
M is imports from EU. 
 
'Trade diversion' with consumption effects 
 All the cases of trade diversion were considered, especially when more efficiently produced 
imports from the ROW are displaced by relatively less efficiently produced commodities from the 
EU due to EPAs – reduction or total elimination of tariffs on the products in view. Product 
sections for which the ROW is a dominant supplier pre-EPA can be taken to indicate that the 
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ROW is more efficient than the EU, but as EPAs lead to 
EU
P < ROW
t
P under the prevailing 
constant production cost conditions the EU becomes the sole supplier to country j, and total 
import diversion will be the upper limit of trade diversion. The contemporary scholars assumed 
that logically, not all imports will be diverted from ROW, and that the EU must initially be 
supplying a reasonable share of imports of a product (at least 20%) to have a capacity for trade 
diversion. The consumption effects due to trade diversion (
TD
M ) were estimated in a similar 
way by assuming that on average the post-EPA price of imports from the EU would lie midway 
between 
ROW
P
 
and ROW
t
P . This is by: 
ROW
O
M
TD
M
t
t
M .).
1
).(
2
1(


                                                                                      (2)                                     
Where    
ROW
O
M Current quantity of imports from ROW 
 
Trade Creation with Consumption Effects 
For those Products where Cape Verde provide smaller or greater than 25% of imports we 
estimated the effects of trade creation with consumption just as the trade diversion case. Here, 
the assumption is that the EU is a more efficient supplier than the rest of the world. If the duty 
free supply price from Cape Verde lies over the relevant range between ROWP
t
and 
EU
P , then 
all of the current imports from the ECOWAS to the home country will be replaced by more 
efficient production from the EU. Thus the maximum value of the trade created 
TC
M for the 
EU by this deflection from ECOWAS sources were estimated by: 
 
ECOWASdTC
MM
t
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M
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Where 
ECOWAS
M
0
 is the current value of imports from ECOWAS 
 
Tariff revenue losses by Cape Verde that are associated with trade diversion were estimated by 
the relationship: 
 
ROW
O
TD
MtR .                                                                                                              (4) 
 
Besides, the tariff revenue loss on imports from EU and Welfare effects were estimated thus:  
 
 
EU
O
C
MtR .                                                                                                                  (5) 
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6.0 Estimating Trade, Revenue and Welfare Effects. 
 We employed the methodology set out in Section 4.0 to estimate trade, revenue and 
welfare effects of an ECOWAS-EU proposed EPAs on Cape Verde and ECOWAS member nations 
in general. Given data availability, detailed analyses were possible for Cape Verde. The import 
data were obtained from UNCOMTRADE statistics data base at the Six-digit level of the 
Harmonized System (HS). We aggregated across categories and economies to obtain ECOWAS-
ECOWAS, ECOWAS-EU and ECOWAS-ROW import values at the same six digit level of the HS. 
All the data are in units of $ US. Tariff data were sourced from the Trade Analysis and 
Information System (TRAINS), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) online source at the six-digit level of the HS. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) Tariff 
data at six-digit level of HS and import demand elasticities were taken from TRAINS. Other data 
sources include ECOWAS Social and Economic Indicators cum ECOWAS Statistical Bulletin; 
Statistical Offices of ECOWAS member nations, African Statistical Yearbook, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank among others. 
 
The Trade Effects 
The overall estimates of the value of trade effects due to consumption, trade diversion, trade 
creation and the corresponding revenue and welfare effects were obtained for a move to EPAs for 
Cape Verde. It is evident from the trade data for Cape Verde and other ECOWAS countries that 
Cote d‟Ivoire, Senegal and Burkina Faso dominated intra-ECOWAS suppliers. Generally, Cote 
d‟Ivoire, Senegal and Burkina Faso accounted for 51.06, 20.02, and 16.57 percents, respectively of 
all the intra-regional imports, while Niger, Nigeria and Cape Verde accounted for less, 7.41, 4.64 
and 0.03 percents, respectively. 
 
Trade Classification Sections Effects 
 Below is a detailed Trade classification (TDC) sections estimates for Cape Verde. The product 
sections where major potential trade effects occur were indicated by these relatively detailed 
sections results. 
From table 3, it is clear given the contemporary assumptions, that only in trade section of 
Wood and articles of wood that great market opportunities for EU suppliers to displace any of the 
other suppliers from ECOWAS and /or ROW. In this section, trade creation outweighs trade 
diversion and EPAs effects will be concentrated here only, implying that local producers will 
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anticipate greater import competition and/or increased competition from EU suppliers, meaning 
that the current imports from the ECOWAS sub-region to Cape Verde (the home country) will be 
displaced by more efficient production from the EU. This trade section only accounted for about 
23% of the total imports (table 2) hence the trade creation out weighing trade diversion. But in 
all other trade sections where trade diversions outweigh trade creation, EU imports were above 
20% meaning that ROW product imports will be displaced by EU which would culminate to 
revenue losses by Cape Verde and or any ECOWAS member nation given tariff removal during 
EPAs negotiations. 
Therefore, to sustain and deepen the existing trade in Cape Verde and for ECOWAS, 
contemporary assumptions on the levels of imports from ECOWAS sub-region to be considered 
before diversions are computed has to be lower than 20% and for Cape Verde to 3 percent 
irrespective of any level of imports from EU. In this regard, the products to be exempted from 
tariff elimination for Cape Verde should include: (i)  Prepared Foodstuff; (ii) Raw hides and Skin; 
(iii) Wood and Articles of Wood; (iv)Textiles and Articles of; (v) Footwear, Headgears among 
others. 
 
Table 3: Cape Verde: Trade Effects (in millions of Dollars) 
 
Country:Cape Verde CE TD & CE TC &CE Revenue Rev. Loss Welfare
TDC Effect due to TD Effect
HS Description Sections
Animal Products TDC 01 108.46 281.7 0.65 -127.5 -0.54 10.8
Veg. Products TDC 02 1011.05 0.84 0.68 -960.22 -0.05 147.34
Animal/Veg ProductsTDC 03 564.34 5.32 0.29 -558.79 -5.75 14.11
Prep foodstuffs etc. TDC 04 1360.36 601.32 8.15 -1225.25 -588.01 136.04
Mineral Products TDC 05 2.34 0.07 0.03 -4.26 -0.08 0.06
Prod. of Chemicals TDC 06 0 0 0 0 0 0
Plastics and Articles TDC 07 0 0 0 0 0 0
Raw hides and Skins TDC 08 74.11 43.1 4.99 -67.58 -36.56 11.05
Wood & Articles of TDC 09 226.41 9.72 923.34 -108.03 -2.7 5.66
Pulp of Wood etc. TDC 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
Textiles & Articles TDC 11 3.63 0.74 0.86 -3.7 -0.32 0.48
Footwear, Headgear TDC 12 154.48 190.8 5.93 -95.16 -168.96 5.95
Articles of Stone etc TDC 13 625.53 280.13 0.48 -271.23 -18.77 31.21
Source: Authors‟ estimation using UNCOMTRADE & UNCTAD TRAINS Tariff Data, 2010 
 
Tariff Revenue and Welfare Effects 
The potential distributional effects of the net effects within the country studied are not balanced 
given that consumers tend to gain significantly as a result of trade creation and consumption 
effects, but at the expense of local producers and as well government tax revenue dwindles. The 
potential tariff revenue losses associated with a shift from the most favored nation tariff 
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structure to a total elimination of tariff as envisaged by EPAs are much given revenue effects of 
different trade classification sections (table 3). Even when much of the products sections 
considered were within the trade classification sections 01-13 corresponding to Hs chapters 01- 
70, being the areas of great potential for  Cape Verde that would lead improved regional 
integration, trade diversion and consumption effect were most pronounced in prepared foodstuffs. 
This gives a total of 43% of the entire trade diversion and consumption effects of the various 
product sections, culminating to 35% of the total revenue loss due to elimination of tariff on 
imports from EU and 72% of the total revenue loss due to trade diversion. Imports from the EU 
are expected to increase remarkably for Cape Verde mainly due to trade creation, diversion and 
consumption effects, while tariff revenue would fall as a result of the increase in duty-free access 
for her EU imports. The consumer as well as national welfare would increase as a result of trade 
creation and consumption effects, but the net welfare in the country is likely going to fall as a 
result of the static trade effects of an ECOWAS-EU EPAs and potentially large costs of trade 
diverted and displaced from efficient ROW and inefficient ECOWAS sources, respectively. From 
table 3 above, the highest revenue effect would be observed in prepared food stuffs, while the 
highest welfare loss would be in vegetable products. Besides, the highest trade creation effect 
would be observed in woods and articles of wood.  
 
Assessing the Effects on Cape Verde 
Import trade data were available and enabled the application of the em pirical method for the 
study of Cape Verde case.  The pattern of Cape Verde imports from the EU, ECOWAS and ROW 
varies in term of values. However, the levels for the expansion of imports from the EU following 
EPAs culminated to consumption and trade diversion effects from the rest of the world, with 
corresponding net welfare losses were evident. Trade diversion with consumption effects 
dominated positive trade creation with consumption effects in Cape Verde. This implies that 
there would be minimal scope for „trade creation‟ and displacement of ECOWAS imports by EU 
imports for Cape Verde would be possible, because there is limited existence or low penetration of 
other regional markets by Cape Verde suppliers, especially for products where displacement by 
EU suppliers is eminent. Besides, producers in Cape Verde would likely lose import share in 
ECOWAS region. This would be offset by sound EPAs negotiations that would consider possible 
adjustments in the bilateral trade liberalization policy that would favor sustenance of existing 
trade and markets within the ECOWAS sub-region. 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Partial Equilibrium Methodology was employed in this study to estimate the potential trade, 
tariff revenue and welfare implications for Cape Verde of accepting to liberalize substantially on 
a wide range of products imports from the EU in an EPA. The analyses were conducted at six-
digit HS level of disaggregation. The results at this level of aggregation will provide useful 
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information to the on-going negotiations between ECOWAS and the EU in determining the 
products to be exempted from tariff removal during EPAs based on the stated severity of the 
effects on product sections, among other considerations. 
The study‟s major conclusions are that Cape Verde is likely to record increases in total 
imports over the existing levels, and there will be significant import substitution away from the 
relatively least cost producers in the rest of the world to EU producers leading to trade diversion. 
The EPA induced import increases will likely add to the pressure in the ECOWAS member 
nation industries, which have already been subjected to prolonged episodes of unilateral 
liberalization (under the structural Adjustment Programme) and  regionalization (regional 
integration). Interestingly there are many product sections in which Cape Verde have low 
potential to develop competitive production to meet regional demand and forge ahead for extra-
regional exports. Unless these product sections traded among Cape Verde and other ECOWAS 
member nations are guarded to sustain and improve production and realize increasing exports, 
the potentials may be undermined subsequently by strong competition when EPAs becomes 
operational. So, measures to include this should be spelt out in EPAs. The need to postpone tariff 
removal on those product sections where Cape Verde is a supplier is therefore, very necessary 
irrespective of the trade volumes recorded. There is the need to adopt this during the EPAs 
negotiations. 
 Furthermore, the study finds that EPAs will lead to loss of tariff revenues, which 
contribute a significant of fiscal resources within for Cape Verde. Fiscal reforms to replace a 
EPAs induced tariff revenue losses are needed. The fiscal reforms should entail shifting revenue 
from trade to non-trade tax sources and improving the efficiency of fiscal revenue collecting 
machinery. Examples of non-tariff instruments that may assume greater importance in revenue 
generation include value-added tax (VAT) and excise taxes charged on imports from the EU. 
 Welfare gains are likely to decline as trade diversion outweighs trade creation. One way 
of addressing net welfare losses related to employment displacement is to undertake production 
and employment adjustment programmes, as well as skill development and productivity 
enhancement programmes. These would facilitate relocation of labour into expanding production 
sectors. Support for such programmes should be negotiated with the EU. 
To sustain the regional traded products and markets, all the traded products among 
countries of the sub-region that result to greater trade diversion as opposed to trade creation 
should be excluded from tariff removal during EPAs negotiations. More so, to deepen the existing 
trade in Cape Verde and for ECOWAS, contemporary assumptions on the levels of imports from 
ECOWAS sub-region to be considered before diversions are computed has to be lower than 20% 
and for Cape Verde to 3 percent irrespective of any level of imports from EU. In this regard, the 
products to be exempted from tariff elimination for Cape Verde should include: (i)  Prepared 
Foodstuff; (ii) Raw hides and Skin; (iii) Wood and Articles of Wood; (iv)Textiles and Articles of; (v) 
Footwear, Headgears among others.  
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Finally, in the meantime, Africa has become one of the fastest growing regions in the 
world, prompting the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, to claim that "Africa offers the 
highest rate of return on foreign direct investment of any developing region in the world ". 
Investors from emerging powers are also convinced of the continent's attractiveness. So, what 
Europe and Africa both need, however, are stronger relations based on a more equal footing, 
where legitimate economic and political interests are openly acknowledged, not couched in 
benevolent, somewhat paternalistic, rhetoric on "development"   
(http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/06/192327.htm ); 
(http://www.ey.com/ZA/en/Issues/Business-environment/2012-Africa-attractiveness-secretary). 
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